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1. Introduction
Sometimes, the facts run out. Faced with a reddish-orangish colour
patch, it seems to many that it is indeterminate, or indefinite, or borderline,
or unsettled, whether the patch is red. The notion of indeterminacy is
deployed all over philosophy — in discussions of vague predicates, the-
ory change, future contingents, incompleteness in mathematics, con-
ditionals, presupposition failure, the paradoxes of self-reference, and
more. But what is this notion? Is there even a single unified concept
that covers all the cases just mentioned? Much sophisticated work has
been done outlining semantico-logical frameworks for indeterminacy.
But they do not directly address one of the most pressing questions
about describing something as indeterminate. Suppose we accept that
p is indeterminate; how should this belief affect our other doxastic
states and wider mental life — in particular, what attitude can we ra-
tionally adopt to p, while holding the belief that p is indeterminate?
What is the cognitive role of indeterminacy judgements?1
This is one instance of a more general topic. We believe, desire,
hope, fear, and act under vague guises. Our best accounts of the inter-
relation between such attitudes (for example, the interrelation between
belief and desire set out in decision theories) often presuppose a clas-
sical backdrop that is under fire in the literature on vagueness. The
methodology below is to approach the direct cognitive-role question
indirectly, through looking at the interplay of beliefs, desires and ac-
tion in the presence of indeterminacy.
Nothing I say here will depend on whether the source of the inde-
terminacy in question is ‘in the world’ or ‘due to language’, or the like.
I will, however, appeal throughout to indeterminacy as an operator,
rather than a predicate of linguistic items. Our cognitive and conative
attitudes to it being indeterminate whether Harry is bald are one thing; the
linguistic expression ‘Harry is bald’ having some particular semantic
1. For work with an emphasis on this question (albeit developed in ways
incompatible with the approach developed here) see, inter alia, (Smith, 2010;
Dorr, 2003; Barnett, 2009; Wright, 2001; Schiffer, 2003; Field, 2003).
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status another. A basic desire to bring about the first is not the same
as a basic desire to bring about the second; altering the meanings of
words is one way to achieve the latter; the former would require ma-
nipulations of Harry’s head.
I will, however, presuppose that there is a good question about
what attitude we take to the proposition that Harry is bald — I suppose
that those words single out a particular proposition we could believe-
true or desire-true, whose truth conditions are indeterminate. A way
of denying this presupposition would be to maintain that the contents
of attitudes are always and everywhere precise — utterly determinate
Fregean thoughts, Russellian structures, or sets of Lewisian worlds. On
the latter view, indeterminacy in what one believes is traced to indeter-
minacy in which precise content one bears the believing-relation. I be-
lieve that the whole discussion to be given below can be reconstructed
in the alternative setting just described; but this is a substantive claim
that I won’t defend here.
The paper is divided into three parts. The first introduces our stalk-
ing horse: a decision puzzle with indeterminacy at its heart. I describe
the setup (1.1), the decision puzzle (1.2), and the possible patterns of
reaction (1.3). A dispositionally inconstant pattern of response is iden-
tified as our target.
In the second section, a model of mind is developed that supports
such inconstant responses. (2.1, 2.2) introduce the basic machinery of
sharpenings and sharpening-induced mental states. (2.3) links mushy
mental states to action, via the decision rules Caprice and Randomize.
These sections are relatively informal, and the appendices regiment
and generalize the proposals. (2.5, 2.6) present and resolve a theoret-
ical worry for the account to do with diachronic coordination. (2.4,
2.7) apply the framework to talismanic puzzles of indeterminacy: the
sorites and forced-march paradoxes.
Section 3 explores an objection due to Adam Elga. The net ef-
fect of this is to bring into sharp relief two competing interpretations
of the framework. One (discussed in 3.2 and 3.3) involves steadfast
indeterminacy-induced uncertainty, supplemented by pragmatic book-
keeping to ensure one’s actions across time do not conflict. The other
(3.4), the mind-making proposal, involves agents genuinely making a
judgement — albeit on an arbitrary basis — -when forced to act under
indeterminacy.
The conclusion highlights the most characteristic features of the
account of decision-making under indeterminacy developed here: its
anti-compromise stance.
1.1 The Cabinet
The survival of a person across time can be an indeterminate matter,
as van Inwagen (1990) emphasizes:
One’s life may be disrupted in various ways. If a pin is stuck into
one’s finger, one’s life goes on. If one is blown to bits by a bomb,
then — even if God immediately puts the bits back together
again — one’s life has ended. . . . If, at the extremes of a spectrum
along the length of which are arranged more and more radical
disruptions of lives, we can find definite cases of the end of a life
and definite cases of the continuation of a life, then it seems rea-
sonable to suppose that somewhere between the extremes will
be found disruptions of which it is not definitely true or defi-
nitely false that they constitute the end of a life. And if this is so,
then there are possible adventures of which it is not definitely
true or definitely false that one would survive them. Let us call
such episodes “indeterminate adventures”. Not everyone — per-
haps hardly anyone — will agree with my contention that one
survives an adventure if and only if one’s life persists through
that adventure. But anyone who thinks that people are complex
material organisms will be hard put to it to deny that possibility
of indeterminate adventures. (van Inwagen, 1990, p.243)
Many cases of this kind involve episodes after which it is indeter-
minate whether there is any person at all around. But another class are
those where it is definite that there are persons before and after the
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episodes, but it’s indeterminate whether it is the same person through-
out. To discuss such cases without getting into the nitty-gritty of how
to set things up for this or that theory of persistence, we’ll follow van
Inwagen in appealing to “the Cabinet”:
Suppose that a person, Alpha, enters a certain infernal philo-
sophical engine called the Cabinet. Suppose that a person later
emerges from the Cabinet and we immediately name him
‘Omega’. Is Alpha Omega? . . . Let us suppose the dials on the
Cabinet have been set to provide its inmates with indeterminate
adventures. (We need not agree on what would constitute an
indeterminate adventure to suppose this. Let each philosopher
fill in for himself the part of the story that tells how the dials
are set). Alpha has entered and Omega has left. It is, therefore,
not definitely true or definitely false that Alpha is Omega. (van
Inwagen, 1990, p.243–4)
If one wants to discuss the impact of indeterminacy on belief, desire,
and action, vague personal identity is a good place to start. The reason
is that our own survival matters to us. One desires, inter alia, that good
things happen to oneself in the future and fears the bad things that
may happen. And these fears and desires are intrinsic, rather than in-
strumental — it is not, in the most usual cases, that one fears one’s
future pain because being in pain is a signal that something else fear-
ful is happening. It is the pain itself one desires to avoid. Of course,
one might also desire that good things happen to loved ones, or that
the welfare of humanity in general is improved. But there’s a particular
kind of self-interested concern that’s extremely psychologically salient.
We can imagine that Alpha takes this to extremes — all that he
cares about is the good or bad things that are going to happen to him.
Our question is: How should Alpha then think about known goods
and evils that happen to Omega? To test this, let some broker offer
Alpha an investment opportunity. He’s certain, we’ll assume, that he
will soon be subject to the Cabinet. For a small investment now by
Alpha (100 dollars perhaps), Omega will benefit to the tune of thou-
sands.2 Alpha is entirely self-interested, but not exclusively present-
self-interested: he’s prepared to give up goods now if doing so brings
him great gains in the future. So if he was certain that Omega was
him, this would be a no-brainer: he’d take the investment like a shot.
But, caring only about his own benefit, if he was certain that he was
not Omega, he’d keep his cash and spend it on a few final nights of
partying. What should he do? What would you do, in his shoes?
1.2 The broker’s offer
How should Alpha think about the broker’s offer? It’s illuminating to
compare the situation to a parallel one that does not involve indeter-
minacy. Perhaps the makers of the Cabinet also make a machine that
gives people chancy, rather than indeterminate, adventures. With the
dials suitably set, anyone who enters this second machine has a 50/50
chance of passing through unscathed. If the dice roll against an inmate,
then he undergoes destruction and reconstruction that (according to
one’s favoured view of personal identity) produces a person determi-
nately distinct from the one who enters. Faced with the certainty he’s
about to enter the chancy Cabinet, and knowing the relevant chances,
the investment decision facing Alpha would be comparatively familiar.
At first pass, he would calculate the expected utility of investing as
opposed to not-investing, and choose whichever maximizes utility.
A first pass at the decision table (not attempting to assign numerical
values at first) would be the following:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest Long life, No party, Short life, No party.
Riches No riches.
Reject Long life, Party, Short life, Party,
No riches No riches.
2. The broker’s offer adapts a case that Bernard Williams discusses in a related
context (Williams, 1970, p.48).
philosophers’ imprint - 3 - vol. 14, no. 4 (march 2014)
j. robert g. williams Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy
Expected utility theory requires we associate numbers with the out-
comes described in the cells above. The determinants of utility of the
outcome described in each cell include: whether an individual has a
long or short life; whether or not they get a party; and whether or
not they get riches (we assume that in all other respects the prospects
are equally good). Let’s suppose that the life up to the point of encab-
ination on its own contributes −100 utils; the extra years come with
a boost of +100 utils on top of this. We’ll assume that having riches
comes with a boost of +100 utils, and a party with a boost of +10.
Lacking riches and lacking a party don’t add or subtract any utils to
the life. We’re then in a position to figure out the net utility for each
cell in the table above. The top left cell includes long life, i.e., a life up
to encabination plus extra years (−100+ 100) and riches (+100), which
will give a net utility of +100 The bottom right cell includes a short life
(−100) and a party (+10), and thus has a utility of −90. Filling in the
other cells likewise, we get the following:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest +100 −100.
Reject +10 −90.
Alpha doesn’t know the exact outcome of either of the actions open
to him. But he does know the relevant chances — we can list the prob-
ability he attaches to each at the head of each column — and using
this he can aggregate the utilities of the two possible outcomes of each
action, to arrive at an overall ranking. The recommended choice is the
action that maximizes expected utility:
P(α = ω)=0.5 P(α 6= ω)=0.5 Expected utility
Invest +100 −100 0
Reject +10 −90 −40
Verdict: Invest
Let us now turn back to the original Cabinet, which delivered in-
determinate rather than chancy adventures. Once more, we can assess
the four outcomes individually. What Alpha values remains the same
— having more years, partying, and riches all add utility. And so, I
will be assuming, the same utilities should be entered into the four
possibilities represented on the decision table.
(In making this assumption, I’m glossing over some differences be-
tween the cases that you might think should make a difference to the
utilities assigned. In the case of the chancy Cabinet, supposing Alpha
survives, he will survive unchanged psychologically and biologically.
With the indeterminate Cabinet, even on the hypothesis one survives,
one knows that one will undergo radical changes; perhaps some [but
not all] memory links to early childhood are erased and some [but not
all] of one’s present plans for the future are erased. In the light of that,
you might think that possibilities featuring extra years should deliver
less of a utility boost for Alpha in the indeterminate Cabinet scenario,
compared to the chancy Cabinet scenario. The exact numbers won’t
matter for the points to be made below, and so we could indeed fac-
tor this in. But for ease of comparison, I’ll be assuming that we add
detail to the indeterminate Cabinet scenario so a utility boost of +100
for the extra years remains appropriate. For example, perhaps the psy-
chological changes will include erasing traumatic memories as well as
welcome ones; perhaps the erasure of some of Alpha’s plans will be
compensated by raising the chance of success in others.)
The table we arrive at takes a familiar form:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest +100 -100.
Reject +10 -90.
The crucial difference is that this time we have no recipe for aggre-
gating the rankings of the two columns. What Alpha knows is that it
is indeterminate which of the columns describes reality aright — but
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this gives little steer about how to proceed.3 Our question is how to
make decisions in the peculiar kind of uncertainty generated by inde-
terminacy.
1.3 Patterns of action
One way to think about the advice we might give Alpha is to imagine
the dispositions to act that agents could in principle have faced with
this decision situation and variations thereof, and then try to pick one
among them as appropriate. I will describe this space of options and
identify one in particular for which it will be our task in what follows
to provide rational underpinnings.
In any particular instance of the broker’s situation, Alpha must ei-
ther invest or reject the offer (doing something indeterminate between
investing and rejecting is not an option at all). So it looks like there
are only two options he must decide between. But we should also re-
member the possibility of randomly choosing what to do among the
available options. To detect these random dispositions to act, suppose
that we repeat the experiment many times over (perhaps with dupli-
cates of Alpha; or perhaps the Cabinet-makers present him with the
investment decision, then take him aside, wipe his memory, and rerun
the experiment). Advice to invest, advice to reject, or advice to pick
one or the other with certain chances predict different patterns under
this repeat examination. Alpha might invariably invest, invariably not
invest, or behave in an inconstant manner, sometimes investing and
sometimes not investing (with the long-run frequency matching up to
the chances in the mixed strategy). To gain even more information, we
could include among the repetitions variations in the parameters of the
setup. We could, for example, raise or lower the prize given to Omega
if Alpha invests.
There are four salient possibilities here for what the overall pattern
3. The situation is reminscient of the classic puzzle of decision-making under
uncertainty rather than risk, expected-utility theory being the inheritor of the
latter tradition. A classic text on these matters is Luce and Raiffa (1989).
will look like:
Universal Acceptance Alpha displays constant behaviour and always
accepts the broker’s offer no matter how much money is offered to
Omega.
Universal Rejection Alpha displays constant behaviour and always
rejects the broker’s offer no matter how much money is offered
to Omega.
Threshold This pattern of behaviour features constant behaviour for a
fixed level of prize. But when we vary the prizes awarded to Omega,
there is a a tipping point. Prizes below this threshold invariably lead
to not-investing; prizes above it lead to investing.
Inconstant Even for fixed prizes, Alpha acts inconstantly, sometimes
investing, sometimes rejecting duplicate contracts. Subvarieties of
this pattern involve a fixed frequency of investing vs. rejecting, or
a varying frequency (perhaps depending on the exact contract of-
fered).
Subsequent sections explore the Inconstancy view. The purpose of
this paper is not to provide reasons for endorsing Inconstancy as the
right reaction to the decision puzzle. It is rather to develop a model
of the cognitive role of indeterminacy that would rationalize Incon-
stancy, and to explore the implications of that model (insofar as those
predictions look plausible, that will of course support the model, and
Inconstancy). But the reader might reasonably ask, if not for a knock-
down argument for the position, at least for a sketch of why one might
find that option worth exploring. So I’ll sketch one possible route to
this conclusion, in the specific case of personal identity.4
4. I argue in (Williams, 2012) that indeterminacy admits of a plurality of
cognitive roles, so I’d be wary of arguing that because Inconstancy is moti-
vated in application to one instance of indetermiacy, it is motivated across the
board. Some other possible routes are more general. For example, I think that
the Inconstancy-friendly “Mind-Making” model that I develop below handles
cases of indeterminacy in law very nicely; I think it provides the best model
of the kind of Ontological Anti-realism described by (Chalmers, 2009) and that
it can be supported in the case of secondary properties by the anti-verdict-
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The motivation I’ll offer is by elimination of alternatives, supposing
(pace Parfit, 1971) that personal identity is what matters in survival.
First, I argue that the Universal Acceptance and Rejection options are
incompatible with that thesis. If personal identity matters in survival
then one’s self-interested actions should be sensitive to the welfare pos-
sessed by y in outcomes iff y is oneself. But suppose one is a Uni-
versal Rejector. Then it looks like one’s self-interested actions simply
discount the interests of y, whenever it’s indeterminate whether y is
oneself. Modus tollens applies: one is not y. Thus, on the assumption
that we’re Universal Rejectors, indeterminate survival collapses into
non-survival. There’s a dual worry for Universal Acceptors — if what
happens to indeterminate y always matters to one’s self-interested ac-
tion, then modus ponens on the same biconditional gives us that y is
oneself. So indeterminate survival collapses to survival. Further, if each
premise of the above argument is determinately true, the conclusions
hold determinately — and that amounts to a reductio.
That leaves the Threshold and Inconstancy views standing. So our
question will be: Is there any problem in combining the view that iden-
tity matters in survival with the Threshold view? In (Williams, ript) I
explore exactly that combination. I argue that the combination (if not
produced by ordinary uncertainty, as an epistemicist might argue) is
best understood as committed to a nonclassical, degree-theoretic treat-
ment of vagueness (following Lewis, 1976). If that is right, then reasons
for rejecting epistemicist and degree-theoretic accounts of vagueness
will be reasons for rejecting the Threshold view. The growing crowd
of non-epistemicist classicists, for example, I think should regard all
alternatives but the Inconstancy view as eliminated.5
exclusion arguments of (Wright, 2003).
5. Non-epistemicist classicism was until relatively recently a fringe view, but
in the last ten years or so has gained many advocates. See (Fine, 1975) (in his dis-
cussion of the conceptual priority of penumbral truth); McGee and McLaughlin
(1994) (though they regard it only as one disambiguation of “truth” talk), Dorr
(2003), Greenough (2008), Barnett (2009), Barnes (2007), Barnes (2010),Barnes
and Cameron (2009), Barnes and Williams (2011) and Eklund (2010).
2. Uncertainty and Inconstancy
Our goal is to find rational underpinnings for inconstant behaviour
in the presence of indeterminacy.6 First I want to make explicit the
semantic skeleton on which the account will be built.
(A housekeeping note: In what follows I will be attributing semantic
properties to truth-bearers. I’ll also be talking about the consequences
these semantic properties have for attitudes such as believing that Al-
pha is Omega where the embedded claim is indeterminate. One might
be worried about a mismatch here, since usually truth-conditional the-
orizing focuses on the semantic properties of sentences, whereas be-
liefs have propositions as their objects. But there are plenty of ways in
which the mismatch could be avoided. Perhaps the vehicles of truth
and falsity in semantic theory are sentences, and beliefs consist in a
relation to a mentalese sentence.7 Or perhaps beliefs and desires are
in the first instance relations to Fregean thoughts; and then the truth-
conditional theory should be construed as setting out a theory of the
truth-conditions of such entities. But it doesn’t matter that much how
it is achieved; what I need is that there is such a match. Under the
presupposition that I flagged at the start — that the truth-conditions of
the objects of our attitudes are themselves indeterminate — I predict
that the matching thesis can be made to hold.)
2.1 Supervaluational indeterminacy
I will work with a broadly supervaluational treatment of indeterminacy.
6. As already mentioned, my ideas in this area are shaped by Crispin Wright’s
work (see especially Wright, 1976, 2001, 2003), though the way I develop the
idea is very different. My thinking below — especially the association of a de-
gree theory with partial dispositions to act in conflicting ways, which grew
into the weightings of Randomize — grew directly out of engagement with the
characterization of vagueness-related degrees of partial belief in Schiffer (2003)
— especially the brief characterizations of their characteristic ambivalence. Schif-
fer assures me, however, that his account should be intepreted as excluding the
kind of inconstant behaviour I appeal to. Closest to the model I develop is the
contextualist account of Shapiro (2006), which faces a quasi-supervaluational
notion of conversational score.
7. See the belief* relation of (Field, 1978).
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Indeterminacy, on this conception, involves a kind of unsettledness be-
tween candidate truth-value assignments to propositions. An epistemi-
cist thinks there’s One Correct Way of scattering truth and falsity over
sentences or propositions, given the way the world is (including, in-
ter alia, over the claim that Alpha is Omega — this comes out either as
true or as false). The supervaluationist agrees that these are decent can-
didates to be truth-value assignments, but holds that the relevant facts
do not select one in particular as uniquely correct. Some candidates
can be thrown away — those that give clearly wrong truth values to,
e.g., ‘Alpha is human’, or say that some borderline colour patches are
red, while colour patches even redder than them are not red. But even
once all this information is in, there remain many candidate classical
truth-value assignments {s1, s2, . . . , sn} = S.8 We call the members of
S sharpenings. The classical case is simply the limiting case where S is
a singleton; but indeterminacy characteristically is manifested by the
presence of multiple sharpenings. A sentence or proposition is indeter-
minate iff some of these sharpenings declare it true and others classify
it as false. It is determinately true if all agree it is true, and determi-
nately false if all agree it is false.9
There are some neat features of this picture. To start with, all classi-
cal tautologies (like the law of excluded middle) are true on each classi-
cal interpretation and so a fortiori on all the si in our set of sharpenings.
So classical tautologies will be determinately true. Supervaluationism
is closer to classical logic than many other semantic models of indeter-
minacy. Furthermore, we can make room within the model for talk of
“degrees of truth” (or degrees of determinacy, if the former vocabulary
makes one queasy). A sentence or proposition p is true to degree k iff
k = |{s∈S:p is true on s}||S| .
10 Such degrees of truth will be structured like a
8. I’ll standardly work with finite sets; though in actual applications, we ex-
pect there to be infinitely many sharpenings. Everything I will say can be easily
generalized to that case.
9. Some loci classici: (van Fraassen, 1966), (Fine, 1975), (Keefe, 2000).
10. In the infinite case, we need to appeal to a (normalized) measure over the
set of sharpenings, and then let the degree of truth of p be the measure of the
classical probability — something we will exploit below.11
This much structure I will suppose. But I am neutral on many other
matters that supervaluationists need to take stances on, particularly on
matters of truth and logic. I do not say what formal construct within
the semantics is to be identified with truth; nor how to define logic in
this setting. My own view is that supervaluationism is not a single view
but a whole family, and the right way to individuate family members is
to describe their interactions with belief, desires, and decision-making.
Questions of what counts as truth, and what logic, should be settled
after one has got clear on the roles that the basic features of the model
play in our wider life. (My own view is that the package to follow is
naturally paired with a classical, bivalent treatment of truth and logic.
But nothing in the technical development to follow will depend on
such issues.12)
2.2 Indeterminacy-induced uncertainty
In the classical, bivalent setting, one familiar model of ideal psycholog-
ical states associated with propositions are point-like credences: full
confidence in p if p is true, no confidence if it is false. Cases of un-
certainty are similarly point-like, represented by real numbers strictly
between 1 and 0. Corresponding, the desirability or utility of a propo-
sition can be represented by real numbers (like those entered into our
representation of the chancy Cabinet earlier). Overall, a classical state
of mind will be a pair of a probability and utility function, 〈p, u〉.
There is an alternative model of uncertainty: the “imprecise” or
“mushy” credence model favoured by, inter alia, Isaac Levi (1974).13
set of sharpenings that makes p true.
11. These supervaluational degrees of truth (or something like them) are
explored in (Lewis, 1970; Edgington, 1997; Kamp, 1975; Cook, 2002) and
(Williams, 2011). For criticism, see (Smith, 2008).
12. Pairing bivalent truth with a supervaluational model is a familiar theme —
see Fine (1975) for an early exploration. (Williamson, 1994, ch.5) argues against
this being a version of supervaluationism.
13. There are too many varieties to survey here, but see Joyce (2010) for the state
of art within philosophy, and Weatherson (ript) for references to some of the
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The idea here is to represent a person’s doxastic state not by a single,
precise credence, but by a whole set of them, represent the agents’ open-
mindedness or uncertainty between the various more particular views.
Likewise for desirability/utility. So we expect to associate an agent
not with a single classical state of mind but with a whole set of them:
{〈p1, u1〉, . . . , 〈pn, un〉}. You are in some sense undecided between the
views expressed by the classical states of mind within this set.
On this mushy credence model, there are two dimensions of un-
certainty available. One can have a particular level of confidence in a
question, which doesn’t reach the poles of complete certainty or utter
rejection. Or one might be in the dark even about particular levels of
confidence. Faced with a fair coin, midway through being flipped, one
can justifiably be half-confident that it will land heads. But (say some
advocates of mushy credences) the question of the state of the econ-
omy a few years down the line, where statistics have proved a poor
guide in the past, demands a more radical kind of uncertainty — one
aptly captured by representing the range of levels of confidence one is
open to.
There’s clearly an analogy between the way that supervaluationism
generalizes classical semantics and the way that Levi-like mushy cre-
dences generalize classical states of mind. This hasn’t gone unnoticed
— indeed, Levi describes his view as one involving “indeterminate be-
liefs”. But this kind of generalization of classical states of mind needn’t
be (and usually is not) tied to a response to indeterminacy. However,
the view to be explored below makes exactly this connection.14
The rough idea, then, is that if p is known to be indeterminate, then
one’s attitude to p is represented not by a single level of confidence,
but by a whole set of them (or more generally, one’s doxastic state is
wider literature and the variety of approaches being pursued. (Jeffrey, 1983) is
perhaps the version closest in spirit to the approach I will be developing here.
14. I should note that a connection of this kind — sometimes accompanied
by the additional gloss that it is indeterminate which of the classical beliefs
described by elements in the mushy state the agent subscribes to — is very
common in conversation. I do not know of places in the literature where it is
examined in detail, however.
represented not by a single probability function, but by a set of them).
But to tighten this up, we need to ask: what probabilities, in particu-
lar, make it into the set? It is here that the supervaluational model of
indeterminacy comes in.
Let’s go back to our worked example. Alpha, we may assume,
knows exactly which particle-configurations will arise, for each action
he may take. The difficulty is that ‘Alpha survives as Omega’ is true
at one of these possibilities relative to one sharpening, and false at the
same possibility relative to other sharpenings. So even though Alpha
has perfectly definite credences over the possible worlds, the proper
degrees of belief he should have over sentences or (fine-grained) propo-
sitions cannot be read off.15 But here is the rub: holding fixed a sharp-
ening one can read off a definite truth-value assignment for sentences
or propositions at those worlds. And so, relative to each sharpening,
there’s a natural proposal for reading off appropriate degrees of belief
in each vague sentence/proposition: it should be equal to the credence
he invests in those worlds at which the proposition is true according
to that sharpening.
For example, relative to an α = ω sharpening, and with Alpha hav-
ing underlying credence 1 that he enters the Cabinet and Omega will
emerge, the appropriate degree of belief for him to have in surviving
encabination is 1. Relative to the α 6= ω sharpening, the appropriate
degree of belief in the same proposition is 0. If Alpha were only 0.5 con-
fident that he would enter the Cabinet tomorrow morning (the alterna-
tive being that it was all a bad dream and he’ll definitely survive) the
appropriate degree of belief in him being around tomorrow evening
would be 1 on the α = ω sharpening and 0.5 on the α 6= ω sharpening.
In short, relative to an underlying credence distribution over worlds,
the sharpenings induce a set of degrees of belief. Details are given in
appendix A.
15. Notice: I’m here thinking of worlds as describing directly particle configu-
rations — think of them as Lewisian space-times, or ersatz sets of sentences in
a world-making language that is expressively restricted to talk of fundamental
features of the world.
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This kind of projection works equally well for utility. Alpha, we
said, cares only about himself getting benefits. Relative to a sharpening,
we know exactly who Alpha is across times and worlds (and whether
he benefits there). So relative to that sharpening we can assign specific
utilities to outcomes. But of course, rival sharpenings may lead to very
different utility assignments. We see that in Alpha’s decision puzzle.
One sharpening assigns Omega having money high utility; the other
assigns situations where Omega gets money no extra utility.
More abstractly: if we desire P intrinsically, the rule might be that
any world such that P gets +1 utility. If it’s indeterminate whether P
is true at w, we don’t have a straightforward way to pick out a sin-
gle utility function over worlds. Relative to a sharpening, however, we
can construct a utility function in this way. We can combine this with
the indeterminacy-induced belief state described above to get a mushy
mental state: a set of belief-desire pairs. Details are given in appendix B.
Thus the supervaluational machinery, together with the vaguely spec-
ified utility-determination recipe, generates a set of utility functions.
So our model predicts the desirability-analogue of uncertainty. When
I talk of an agent’s (mushy) mental state, I will be talking of this set of
belief-desire pairs.
On this model indeterminacy will be characterized by a certain
distinctive kind of indeterminacy-induced uncertainty. Now, typically,
such uncertainty will show up in the very proposition one knows to
be indeterminate. But this is not always the case: sometimes we can
know that something is indeterminate and yet have a perfectly settled
level of confidence in it, consistently with the model just described.16
16. In appendix A, I give one example: one can know that it is indeterminate
whether p, since p is indeterminate at both the worlds one regards as open
possibilities, and yet meet the coherence conditions above by having mushy
credences over the worlds, while retaining degree of belief 1 in the known-
indeterminate proposition. One might be sceptical, however, about whether
this particular combination is a permissible belief state. (I won’t need to sup-
pose it is until the model discussed in the closing subsection — it will not arise,
as far as I can see, if we require agents to have a definite credence distribu-
tion over worlds). But even so, we can find examples where the level of confi-
The cognitive role of indeterminacy in this setting manifests in global
constraints on mental states, but it does not require a specific kind of
uncertainty-related attitude to the proposition that is known to be in-
determinate.17
2.3 Caprice and Randomize
With this account of Alpha’s mental state in hand, look back to the
broker’s offer and the choice that Alpha faces. Earlier we represented
the information available as follows:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest +100 -100.
Reject +10 -90.
We are now in a position to describe what this represents. One can
think of the columns in such a decision table as representing a partition
of Alpha’s mushy mental state. Possibilities within a given cell of this
partition agree on enough of the facts to assign the same utility to each
action. The numbers in each entry in that column record the desirabil-
ity (expected utility) of the relevant action. Equivalently, you can think
of the column as a set of sharpenings — the sharpenings that induce
dence in known-indeterminate propositions is the same throughout the mushy
mental state. Suppose ‘hails’ is indeterminate in reference between ‘heads’ and
‘tails’. I am 0.5 confident that the fair coin will land heads and 0.5 confident that
it will land tails. On either sharpening, therefore, the degree of belief appropri-
ate to ‘the coin will land hails’ is 0.5. So here there is no mushy uncertainty, but
a pointy degree of belief, in the proposition in question.
17. A last note about the indeterminacy-induced belief states described above:
Unlike Levi, and much of the literature on mushy belief, the belief states above
are not closed under convex combinations. To insist on such closure would be
utterly ad hoc, in our setting — however natural it is for uncertainty generated
by other sources. This does have distinctive consequences, and is implicated
in the problems we face in the final section. Some believers in mushy mental
states for reasons other than indeterminacy, such as Richard Jeffrey, already
reject convex closure as a constraint in set-like belief states.
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the respective elements of the mushy mental state.18 Given what Al-
pha knows about the broker situation, the mental states induced by a
given sharpening will agree on their evaluations of the utility of an act
just in case they agree on whether Alpha is Omega. Hence, what we
learn from the decision table above is that Alpha’s mushy mental state
is mushy exactly on the crucial issue: whether investing is preferable
to rejecting the broker’s offer, or vice versa.
What this gives us is an interpretation of what’s going on in the
table. It regiments the problem, but we can’t yet read off any impli-
cations for how Alpha may permissibly act. Quite generally, it’s one
thing to have formal tools for representing belief (or mental) states,
quite another to spell out the relevance of these states for one’s wider
psychology or behaviour. And that of course is precisely what we need
to reach a recommendation for whether he should accept the broker’s
offer.
There are many possible decision rules that may be associated with
the mushy-mental-state representation. One common basis for deci-
sion rules given a mushy mental state is the following dominance prin-
ciple: that if an action is impermissible (does not maximize expected
utility) on every belief-desire pair in the mushy mental state, then it
is impermissible simpliciter. Contrapositively, each permissible action
must be optimal by the lights of some belief-desire pair to which one’s
uncertainty leaves one open.
The decision-rule that Weatherson (ript) labels “Caprice” says that
the dominance principle is both necessary and sufficient for permis-
sibility. Decision-making under uncertainty, on this view, characteris-
tically leaves the agent options, since more than one act may be per-
missible.19 A different option is to supplement the dominance prin-
ciple with further rules. Levi’s preferred approach takes this form —
once we have the arena of “admissible” options, we select among them,
18. For issues about whether a sharpening will induce a unique mental state,
see appendix C.
19. Of course, ordinary expected utility theory also leaves one options, where
the expected utility of a pair of acts is tied.
by choosing the one (roughly) that guarantees us the best worst-case-
scenario.20
We wanted a model that would provide intelligible underpinnings
for inconstant behaviour in the presence of indeterminacy. From that
perspective, Caprice seems attractive. Let’s look again at our tabular
representation of the broker’s offer, this time listing in a final row what
each column taken individually recommends Alpha do:




According to Caprice, this would make both investing and rejecting
permissible — exactly what we want, if inconstant behaviour is what
we’re seeking to fit. So our initial conjecture can be that Caprice is
an appropriate decision rule for indeterminacy-induced mushy mental
states.
The package of Caprice and sharpening-generation of uncertainty
fits nicely with Alpha’s actions being inconstant when faced with the
Cabinet. After all, investing looks good on one sharpening (that on
which Alpha is Omega, and hence gets the returns) and seems terrible
on the other. Inconstant acts are catered for, since we may interpret
20. Notice that we can think of this second-stage rule in quite a few ways.
It might be a rationally enforced choice rule, on a par with expected-utility
maximization in the point-like setting. It could on the other hand simply be a
description of how we cope with the optionality Weatherson diagnoses. Or it
might be something in between. Here’s one approach I find intriguing: Think
of impermissibility as a thin normative evaluation of actions, and let Caprice
be the end of the story so far as that goes. Consistent with this, there may be
many more thicker evaluations of actions — actions may be biased, or reck-
less, or overcautious, etc. So one might think of different second-level decision
rules as associated with different dimensions of evaluation — Levi’s rule being
an articulation of what one must do to avoid the charge of recklessness, for
example.
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them as cases where Alpha capriciously opts to act on the basis of one,
or the other, sharpening.
But while the package of indeterminacy-induced mushy mental
states and the Caprice rule is consistent with inconstant behaviour in
decision-making under indeterminacy, the package does not predict it.
Caprice is committed only to the permissibility of a certain range of ac-
tions. That is compatible with an agent being disposed to dogmatically
stick to one particular sharpening no matter what. Such an agent is not
disposed to act inconstantly. Furthermore, a capricious agent might
capriciously opt for the survival sharpening iff the reward is over a
given amount, and opt for the non-survival sharpening iff the reward
is lower. So, it appears, a capricious agent is consistent with Thresh-
old pattern of behaviour under repetitions. (Such examples could be
multiplied: perhaps a pessimistic agent would capriciously opt for that
action whose minimum sharpening-relative utility is highest; an opti-
mistic one for the one whose maximum sharpening-relative utility is
highest: in our case these correspond to Universal Rejection and Ac-
ceptance respectively). If we allow such patterns, then it seems there
is the potential for a whole body of different systematic dispositions
to capriciously choose. In some contexts, this might be welcome flexi-
bility. But we wanted an account that commits to Inconstancy and so
shuts off these highly patterned options.
I suggest we replace/supplement the Caprice rule with a second-
order rule for selecting which member of our mushy mental state to
act in accordance with — one that in effect says that we must choose
which way to go arbitrarily. This is the Randomize rule.21 Given a deci-
sion situation in which one must choose whether to φ or ψ, if k sharp-
enings recommend φing, and 1− k ψing, then one should choose at
21. Compare (Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser, 1977; Sunstein and
Ullmann-Margalit, 1999) on picking vs. choosing as a policy for selecting how
to act; note that one of the cases mentioned as one where the rule is appro-
priate is where the “alternatives are in some respect incommensurable”. The
phenomenology and rationality of “big decisions” not based on weighing rea-
sons is further explored in (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004). Thanks to Laurie Paul for
pointing me to this interesting literature.
random — φing with chance k and ψing with chance 1 − k.22 So a
given piece of behaviour will be describable in two ways — as being
in accordance with Caprice as originally characterized, with the oper-
ative sharpening selected truly arbitrary; or alternatively as being the
result of Randomize, generating a mixed act uniquely determined by
the proportions of sharpenings supporting one act over another.
What Randomize tells you to do is choose randomly among your
original set of options. It will be very important in what follows that
we clearly distinguish this advice from a closely related procedure one
could follow: to decide to flip a coin to determine which option to
take (perhaps you delegate the actual implementation of A and B to a
friend, telling her to do A if the coin lands heads, B if it lands tails).
The latter involves choosing to randomize between A and B. The choice
to randomize over A and B is different from choosing A, even if (as
it happens) the coin lands heads and A is brought about. By contrast,
choosing at random between A and B, as I’m conceiving it, results in
you choosing A or you choosing B — it’s just that you don’t have a
settled disposition ahead of time about which to go for. On this model,
randomness is a property of the eventual choice (choosing at random is
a way of choosing, just as choosing quickly or confidently are ways of
choosing) — but it isn’t part of the content of the choice.
The distinction between random choices and choices to randomize
is a real one, as we can see from other areas in which we need to ap-
22. Two things to note here: first, this talks of sharpenings issuing recommenda-
tions, but strictly speaking it is elements of our mushy mental state that evalu-
ate options for action. In appendix C I briefly sketch why this is an acceptable
slide. Second, the formulation of Randomize given in the text is applicable
only when there are only finitely many sharpenings. However, in formulating
the underlying supervaluational semantics earlier, I mentioned the possibility
of the package including a designated measure over the sharpenings, used to
define “degree of determinacy/truth” of sentences or propositions. I propose
that in general we use this to fix the odds relevant to the Randomize rule. The
result will be that the Randomize rule will assign a chance of φing equal to the
measure of sharpenings that induce mental states that recommend φing. For
simplicity, I’ll continue to work with the pretence that there are finitely many
sharpenings (and that any measure is a uniform distribution over these).
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peal to it. Suppose that we are in an “al-Ghazali date” or “Buridan’s
ass” situation, poised between two equally attractive alternatives. We
have two cupcakes, A and B, and attach equal utility to eating either
(though we cannot eat both). How should we decide what to do, given
we have two equally good options? It’s very natural to advise some-
one in this situation to make an arbitrary choice — to choose at ran-
dom whether to eat A or B. But it would be perverse to interpret this
piece of commonsensical advice as involving (a) the expansion of the
agent’s conception of the available actions to include random acts such
as flipping a coin to determine what to do; and (b) the advice to opt
for one of the randomizations, as opposed to simply taking cupcake
A. After all, flipping the coin has exactly the same utility as taking A in
the first place — so the expected utility of the available actions are just
as tied as they were in the original scenario, except with three, rather
than two, options.23 So the expansion of options doesn’t help at all in
giving a principled basis for action. If one is going to end up resolving
the symmetry by plumping for a particular action out of a tied set of
options you could just as well have recommended (say) A at the first
stage. I think it’s pretty clear that this is an uncharitable interpretation
of the commonsensical advice, and once we recognize one can choose
randomly without choosing to randomize, we have a much better ac-
count.
Confusing randomly choosing and choosing to randomize in
23. This is a simplification, based on assuming that the expected utility of ran-
domizing between A and B is simply a weighted average of the utilities of A
and B. But the utility of flipping a coin (or using any other randomizing device)
turns in part on consequences of the coin flipping itself. If a coin-hating mad-
man is hiding in the bushes, waiting to shoot anyone who randomizes in this
way, that obviously decreases the utility of flipping. There could be madmen
(equipped with appropriate brain-scanners) who are disposed to punish those
who choose randomly. As a problem for Randomize, this is comparable to sit-
uations involving madmen (equipped with brain-scanners) disposed to punish
those making decisions by optimizing expected utility; or those who make de-
cisions in cases of Levi-an uncertainty by minimizing the worst outcome. How
to think about situations where following the rules of rationality is itself punished
is a very hard (and general) issue, and I won’t pursue it here.
Ghazali-Buridan situations results in rather odd interpretations of com-
monsense advice. It’s a far worse confusion in the context of indeter-
minacy — since (it will turn out) flipping a coin to decide between the
options left open by sharpening-relative decision tables may actually
be an act that is impermissible. For more on this, see the end of section
three.
2.4 Application to speech acts and the sorites argument
Randomize gives some interesting and plausible predictions about our
attitudes to the sorites paradox. The most persuasive way I know to
motivate the paradox is to ask people to first consider claims of the
following form: Fa ∧ ¬Fa′, where a and a′ are adjacent in a sorites
series. F may be ‘red’, and a and a′ different though indiscriminable
shades on the continuum from red to orange, for example. The data is
that such conjunctions seem flatly false — indeed, it seems they could
not be true. So, naturally enough, we assert the negation. But that is just
to endorse something equivalent to the material conditional Fa ⊃ Fa′.
Repeating this reasoning for other indiscriminable pairs along a sorites
series, and chaining the resulting conditionals together, we just need
to keep applying modus ponens to derive a contradiction — assuming
we also classify some clearly scarlet patch as red, and some clearly
orange patch as not red.
So what does our current account say about this? Well, it’s a story
about action in the first instance. But we take it that in motiviating
the sorites paradox, what we are asking people to do is act — to utter
words. Let’s model this by supposing that when S means p, then af-
firming S when p has utility +1; affirming S when ¬p has utility −1.
Mutatis mutandis for the utility of denying S. Consider some particu-
lar predication of red to a borderline colour patch (Patchy) drawn from
our sorites series.
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Patchy is red Patchy is not red
Affirm ‘Patchy is red’ +1 −1
Deny ‘Patchy is red’ −1 +1
Verdict: Affirm Deny
According to Caprice, both affirming and denying the sentence
‘Patchy is red’ are (separately) permissible. Once we add Randomize
to the mix, we get stronger predictions. The chances of affirmation will
increase with the proportion of sharpenings that make Patchy red. If
Patchy is pretty reddish, then many ways of placing the cutoff will
make it red, and so we expect most sharpenings to declare it red, and
our model predicts a high chance of affirmation. If Patchy is flat border-
line, then the chances of affirmation and denial will be evenly balanced.
If Patchy is close to the clear non-red cases, the chances of affirmation
will be tiny, and the chances of denial high. This all seems sensible.
An even nicer prediction of Randomize given this model of speech
acts is its predictions about behaviour faced with the sorites itself. Let’s
suppose, with the same utilities, we face a choice whether to affirm or
deny one of the statements, resulting in the following decision table:
cutoff between a, a′ cutoff elsewhere
Affirm ‘Fa ∧ ¬Fa′’ +1 -1
Deny ‘Fa ∧ ¬Fa′’ -1 +1
Verdict: Affirm Deny
Now, the proportion of sharpenings which place the cutoff between
that particular pair of indiscriminable colour patches we can reason-
ably take to be a tiny proportion of the available sharpenings. If we
implement Randomize, the chances of affirmation are minute, and the
chances of denial almost 1. Correspondingly (I won’t draw out the
chart this time) the chances of affirming the negation of the cutoff,
or equivalently the conditional Fa ⊃ Fa′, are almost 1. So we expect
agents following these roles almost always to endorse the premises of
the longform sorites argument. If we looked at the conjunction of all
such claims, then every sharpening will think one conjunct is false, and
so the whole conjunction is false. The predicted chance of judging the
conjunction true is 0.
These predictions are very different from those that a Williamso-
nian epistemicist (for example) should offer. An epistemicist should
have very low confidence in the cutoff statements. But they will typ-
ically demur from flat-out judging such statements false. By contrast,
on the present model, on the most likely sharpening we must have
confidence 1 that the cutoff statement is false, not merely very high
credence. Similarly, the epistemicist will presumably say that for all
we know, Fa ∧ ¬Fa′ might be true. There’s no reason for the advocate
of the current framework to agree. Indeed, I think the principled line
here is to assess epistemic modal judgements in a sharpening-relative
manner — under a sharpening where the cutoff for red/not-red is
somewhere else, our knowledge of the colour shades of a and a′ al-
lows us to rule out Fa ∧ ¬Fa′ (after all, that’s why on that sharpening
we feel able to assert its negation). And so, on such sharpenings, we
should equally deny that Fa ∧ ¬Fa′ might be the case. On the present
model, the chances of endorsing the epistemic modal statement are as
low as the chances of affirming Fa∧¬Fa′ itself. That is a sharp contrast
to Williamsonian epistemicism — and I think that it is an attractive re-
sult.
All this suggests the package developed so far is promising. But
Randomize can’t be correct as presently formulated. Well-known di-
achronic puzzles for mushy mental states cause problems for Random-
ize as presently stated. However, I will argue that those same puzzles
motivate a more sophisticated, diachronic version of the package.
2.5 Diachronic puzzles and hyperplanning
Here is the diachronic puzzle for Caprice.24 Suppose the broker offers
24. In fact, it doesn’t affect Caprice as carefully formulated by Weatherson, but
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Alpha the investment opportunity at t. But if Alpha invests, the broker
is going to come back at t + 1 to offer Alpha another deal: this time,
the broker will pay Alpha half the money back (enough to throw a
mediocre party before encabination), so long as Alpha agrees to alter
the earlier contract so nobody gets any money. In short, Alpha faces





If Alpha is at Start, then both Investing and Rejecting are permissi-
ble. Suppose Alpha invests. At t+ 1, the buyback on offer looks a good
deal to Alpha exactly on the sharpening where he does not survive —
so construed, it’s money at no cost! On the sharpening where he does
survive, Alpha is giving up thousands for a trivial gain now. So each
sharpening recommends a different course of action, so again, both op-
tions are permissible by the lights of Caprice, and Randomize tells us
to choose randomly amongst them.
We can verify this by writing out the decision table that faces
Alpha after he has decided to Invest. Just as before, we can assign
utilities to each of the various options. The utility contributed by
it does affect the simple form we’ve been working with. See (Elga, 2010) for the
puzzle in the case of ordinary uncertainty, and for arguments against a range
of possible reactions — including Weatherson’s version of the rule (which Elga
calls “Sequence”).
each factor (years up to encabination; extra years; riches; the original
planned party) will be exactly as before — with the addition that the
mediocre party that Alpha could afford upon accepting the buyback
offer produces a boost of only +5 utils, half of that attaching to
the original party plans. Thus, accepting the buyback offer, on the
sharpening on which Alpha is Omega, produces a net utility of +5:
the result of summing -100 for the life to encabination, +100 for
the post-encabination years, and +5 for the mediocre party. Similar
calculations produce the following table:
α = ω α 6= ω
Accept Buyback Meh party, Meh party,
long life, no riches: short life, no riches:
+5 -95
Reject Buyback No party, No party,
long life, riches: short life, no riches:
+100 -100.
Verdict Reject Buyback Accept Buyback
As predicted, it’s again a case of decision-making under indetermi-
nacy, and Caprice allows Alpha to opt for the non-survival sharpening;
hence it is permissible for Alpha to accept the later deal. Suppose Al-
pha does so. The net effect of Alpha’s route through the decision tree
is that he is down 50 dollars (or 5 utils — the difference between a
great party and a mediocre one), and so is determinately operating at
a loss. So it looks like we have an uncomfortable triad: permissibility
of investing at t, permissibility of accepting the buyback offer at t + 1,
but the intuitive impermissibility of the conjunction of investing and
accepting buyback together, which leads to a guaranteed (and determi-
nate) loss.
One good question is what exactly the puzzle consists in. The per-
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missibility of two actions taken individually doesn’t generally entail
the permissibility of their conjunction. Consider dating norms: it’s per-
missible for A to be in a relationship with B, and permissible for A to
be in a relationship with C, but typically not permissible for A to be
in relationships with both simultaneously. However, the striking thing
about the current case is that the related events are successive, and we
evaluate the later one as permissible even bearing in mind that the earlier
one has already taken place. Given the temporal ordering, there’s some-
thing weird about denying the conjunction is permissible though each
conjunct is. For example: in signing the second contract, does Alpha do
something permissible (qua accepting a buyback offer) or something
impermissible (qua investing-and-then-accepting-buyback)?
The case is intuitively awkward, but no more, I think. Carefully de-
scribed, there is nothing contradictory going on. But what we do learn
is that if agents are to avoid violating norms (including norms govern-
ing conjunctions), then later actions have to be in sync with earlier ones.
Even though it’s permissible in a one-off case to opt for whatever sharp-
ening one likes, in extended chains of action, one needs to ensure that
the product of the individual acts is jointly permissible. Caprice should
be read as characterizing not single actions, but whole sequences, as
permissible when optimal on one element within the mushy mental
state. This is indeed what Weatherson’s version requires.25
Randomize appears to be in more trouble. If Alpha Randomizes on
the first offer, he must give a 50/50 chance (say) to investing. If Alpha
Randomizes on the second offer, he has a 50/50 chance of accepting the
buyback offer. But since the first act has already taken place, the well-
run agent will invest-and-then-buyback in a quarter of cases. But that
overall course of action is uncontroversially impermissible. Randomize
25. Compare (Chang, 2005) on holistic constraints on choices between options
that are ‘on a par’ (but not of equal value). She notes that choices between in-
comparable options have a similar character. One proposal in the literature is
to think of this cluster of phenomenon loosely associated with ‘incomparabil-
ity’ as resulting from indeterminacy in value; I suspect that the analysis here
would fit well with this thought. See (Chang, 2005) for arguments against that
assimiliation.
therefore leads to impermissible courses of action in a way that Caprice
alone (due to its lack of predictive power!) does not.
The natural (and I think correct) reaction is not to abandon Ran-
domize completely, but (like Weatherson) to switch focus from single
actions to sets of actions, and to distinguish two readings of Random-
ize. To say, ahead of time, that the chances in the two successive acts
must be 50/50 in each case does not mean the chances need be indepen-
dent of one another. Indeed, it is compatible with the prior chance of
each being 50/50 that the chance of accepting a buyback offer, given
one has already invested, is zero. To get a model for this, imagine that
an agent must choose the sharpening on which to act at random at the
beginning of an extended series of action, and subsequently must stick
with that sharpening throughout. On one reading of Randomize, the
letter of its recommendation will have been satisfied.
These diagnoses and alterations to Caprice and Randomize come at
considerable cost, however. No longer does our model offer advice in
individual, local decision situations. Since whole courses of action are
evaluated, what is recommended are whole sequences of action. If that
has direct relevance to an agent in a choice situation at all, it would
have to be to an agent who was settling on a plan of action, rather than
how to act in the immediate situation they face. And since we don’t
know which sequence of decisions situations we’ll in fact be faced with,
from the initial position what we’ll need to choose between is complete
contingency plans — plans of what to do in circumstances that may or
may not arise. This would be of use to a fictional hyperplanner — an
agent who before taking any action whatsoever sits down to work out
a complete contingency plan for any situation, choosing the optimal
sequence among those that they may be faced with. In its domain, I
have no wish to quarrel with its recommendations.
The trouble is that we want more from a theory of decision than
advice about the normatively correct hyperplan to adopt. A theory of
rational decision should return advice about the normatively correct
option to take in much more local, limited decision problems. It’s not
in my power to now pick and commit to a hyperplan, any more than
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it’s in my power to throw a dart twenty metres and hit a bullseye.26 A
theory of decision entailing that the thing to do in my situation was to
throw the dart and hit the bullseye wouldn’t be a theory with relevance
to agents like me; and a theory that advised me to pick a hyperplan is
similarly irrelevant.
(The point could easily be lost sight of amidst all the idealizations
that are standardly made in the initial stages of a theory of decision.
We work with logically omniscient agents with perfect recall, who [for
example] when faced with a tree of decisions can perform backward
induction reasoning of arbitrary complexity. But all these idealizations
still retain their connection to real-world decision puzzles: for fixed
information, goals, and available courses of action, the theory tells us
what the best act is to perform. If the reasoning involved is too de-
manding for boundedly rational agents, that doesn’t matter if we take
the job to be to identify the best act, rather than describe how real
agents should practically go about figuring out which act is best. The
usual theory can be seen as an account of how my ideally rational self
would advise me to act in my actual circumstances, holding fixed my
goals and with the options in fact open to me. To retreat to a normative
theory that restricts itself to ranking hyperplans would be to give up
on this project entirely.27)
26. As Michael Caie pointed out to me, one way of keeping track of a hyperplan
is to adopt the particular beliefs and utilities that rationalize that hyperplan. So
unless there is already a problem with keeping track of such sharp mental states,
it’s not clear that there is an in-principle problem. Of course, one motivating
thought behind mushy credences, independent of uncertainty, is exactly the
idea that it’s implausible that actual agents keep track of sharp credences and
utilities.
27. A referee asked why an ideal advisor couldn’t give advice in a local situ-
ation, based on her choice of global hyperplan. But note that a local decision
could be part of two global strategies, one of which is choiceworthy and one
of which is utterly dreadful. An ideal advisor shouldn’t categorically tell me
to take the local option, unless she has some assurance I won’t take the other
choices that add up to the dreadful overall strategy.
2.6 Incrementalizing Caprice and Randomize
What we’d like to do is incrementalize our choice procedure, allowing
agents to partially commit to a course of action, leaving open what
they’ll do at later decision situations, while still ensuring that the ac-
tions in the end are coordinated so they won’t end up losing money
without compensation.
(I’m making a substantive presupposition here — that a finite se-
quence of choiceworthy actions should be something that is itself choice-
worthy, qua sequence.28 Some dispute this principle. Seidenfeld (1994,
§3) holds fixed a particular [controversial] principle of decision-making
under uncertainty and then shows that this forces a rational agent to
choose a dominated path. Infinite decision trees may lead to analo-
gous challenges (Arntzenius et al., 2004). My methodology here is to
assume the connection mentioned above, and then use information
about choiceworthy sequences as guide to constructing an appropriate
local decision rule applicable at individual nodes. After all, there is
instrumental interest in figuring out what sorts of local decision rules
one would have to adopt in order to achieve a choiceworthy sequence,
whether or not those decision rules are rationally mandatory or even
permissible to follow.29)
Assuming that we do wish to incrementalize the choice procedure,
let us first consider the same issue of diachronic coordination for the
simpler decision rule Caprice. We shall assume that in the context of
action there is a contextual “score”: a set that initially contains all the
sharpenings.30 When an action is carried out that is permissible on
some but not all sharpenings, the score updates by eliminating those
on which it is not permissible. (As a special case, when a linguistic act
28. What I’m assuming is what Seidenfeld calls the “traditional view”: that we
may reduce extensive-form games to normal-form ones.
29. In this connection, it’s interesting to note that the example used in Elga’s
challenge to my proposal, discussed in §3 below, bears some resemblance to
the example that Seidenfeld uses to make his case. I thank a referee for this
journal for pointing me toward Seidenfeld’s extremely interesting paper.
30. Compare (Shapiro, 2006), the immediate inspiration for this model. Shapiro
is in turn drawing on (Lewis, 1979)
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is true on some but not all precisifications, those on which it is not true
are eliminated.) We call an action dynamically permissible at time t just
in case it maximizes utility on some sharpening live at the score at t.
The practical implementation of Caprice is that agents should strive to
make their actions dynamically permissible (as well as permissible in
the absolute sense). If successful, they will have ensured that the prod-
uct of their actions during the period in which the score is evolving is
permissible in the absolute sense.31
What of Randomize? The analogous idea is that the mixed act ac-
tually implemented at t should accord with chances that evolve dy-
namically through the action period. Suppose that our decisions are,
first, between A and ¬A and, second, between B and ¬B. Suppose that
AB is a sure loss outcome, and so must be avoided. The percentage of
sharpenings recommending AB, ¬AB, A¬B, and ¬A¬B respectively
are: 0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5.
The first choice is between A and ¬A, and in accordance with our
original Randomize rule, the respective weightings are 0.3 and 0.7 (so
31. Compare Elga’s discussion of the rule Narrow (of course, he is working in
a rather different setting, concerned with the representation of ordinary uncer-
tainty not the indeterminacy-induced kind). The narrowing proposal says that
one’s doxastic change should update upon acting, to eliminate from the repre-
sentor those probability functions that would not recommend the action one
in fact takes. Elga complains that this is a case where one’s doxastic state up-
dates without relevant evidence being gained. In the current setting, we have
a couple of available responses. First, we can think of the doxastic state as be-
ing constant throughout the process, and a separate scoreboard being updated
— the sharpenings and their induced credal functions are still around in the
doxastic state, but some are not live: they have been eliminated from the score-
board. It is the scoreboard, not the doxastic state, that updates and fixes what
is dynamically permissible. But dynamic permissibility is interesting only be-
cause it’s a way of practically ensuring that one’s overall course of action is
(atemporally) permissible by the the lights of the original Caprice or Random-
ize rule — and permissibility in this sense is fixed by the doxastic state alone.
I don’t see any discomfort in non-evidential updating of the scoreboard in this
context. The second option is to endorse Narrow, and take on Elga’s complaints
directly. I discuss this in the Mind-Making interpretation of the framework in
the final section, where I argue that we can identify the information that we
gain that rules out the sharpenings. Thanks to Seamus Bradley for pressing me
on these points.
on repetitions of the choice procedure, the relative frequency of A
choices to ¬A choices will be 3:7). But once the action has been car-
ried out, just as on the Caprice model, the score is updated to elimi-
nate all sharpenings not in accord with the action taken. Suppose we
end up going for the act ¬A at the first choice point. Then we face
a second decision, and since all and only the sharpenings that recom-
mended A have been eliminated, the proportions of B-recommending
sharpenings and ¬B-recommending sharpenings will be 2/7 and 5/7
respectively. At the second choice point we locally Randomize at these
new odds. On the other hand, suppose we chose to A at the first choice
point. Then all remaining sharpenings vindicate ¬B, so applying the
mixed strategy recipe at the second choice point we will go for ¬B
with chance 1.
This dynamic, local version of the Randomize rule accords perfectly
with the original global Randomize rule, on the reading where it is ap-
plied once and for all before any act is taken. Dynamically, there’s a 0.3
chance of getting A, and that then ensures we get ¬B, so the chance
of ending up with A¬B is 0.3, as it should be. Likewise, there’s a 0.7
chance of getting ¬A, and given this a 2/7 chance of B, for a 0.2 chance
of ¬AB overall; and a 5/7 chance of B following ¬A, for a 0.5 chance
overall. The overall chance of getting ¬B through some route or other
is 0.5, and likewise for B. The incremental recipe is a practical way of
(locally, dynamically) implementing the mixed strategies at their orig-
inal ratios.32 This is no coincidence. Effectively, given initial chances
Ch, the chance of choosing A at the first choice point is Ch(A), and the
chance of choosing ¬A is Ch(¬A). If the first is realized, the chance of
choosing B at time 2 is Ch(B|A). If the second is realized, the chance of
choosing B at time 2 is Ch(B|¬A). The overall chance of B is therefore
Ch(A)Ch(B|A) + Ch(¬A)Ch(B|¬A), which, by the law of total prob-
ability, is simply Ch(B). So the diachronic version of Randomize is a
32. In the setting with infinitely many sharpenings, and consequently a mea-
sure over them, we simply need to conditionalize the measure to remove the
sharpenings that have been eliminated, and then use this derived measure over
the live score to set the local chances for the mixed acts.
philosophers’ imprint - 17 - vol. 14, no. 4 (march 2014)
j. robert g. williams Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy
way of implementing the original atemporal Randomize strategy.
2.7 Application to the forced-march sorites
I’ve just been arguing that for practical purposes, at least, Randomize
needs to be construed as invoking chances for judging this way or that,
evolving over time. This is a prediction of the account: how well does
it fit data? We can test this by thinking again about the special case of
linguistic action. I’ll adopt the same model as before, where utilities
for linguistic action are assigned based on the truth value of the claim
made.
Consider the forced-march sorites. This might again concern a set
of colour patches, pairwise indiscriminable, taken at small intervals
from the continuum from red to orange. The forced-march process is
to ask a subject to classify a given colour patch as red or not. One starts
with clear red cases and then marches down the sorites asking about
the redness of successive patches. Presumably the subject starts by clas-
sifying a scarlet patch as red. The first time she calls a patch not-red,
she will have done something that seems utterly unprincipled — after
judging the last patch red, she has now judged an indiscriminable one
not-red. Taking the judgements together, she has effectively committed
herself to the location of the red/not-red cutoff. There are many things
to say about the forced-march sorites, but the immediate phenomenol-
ogy that everyone needs to account for is that there is enormous felt
pressure to judge the next colour patch red, given one has judged the
last one red. And this is so even when, if you were given the same
patch “cold”, you’d more likely reach a different verdict. Past history
seems to bias your judgement. How?
Let’s build a toy model of the situation.33 Suppose that 99 bor-
derline cases of redness are indexed from 1 to 99, from almost-
33. As a referee notes, the toy model below predicts a uniform distribution of
the chances of defecting from red to not-red in the forced-march sorites. This
is simply an artifact of the simple model of the distribution of determinacy
over sharpenings that we use. By changing the determinacy-measure over the
sharpenings we could predict all sorts of other distributions.
determinately-red to almost-determinately-not-red. There are 100 ways
of drawing the red/not-red cutoff, and we treat these as the initial set
of sharpenings. One is then asked, of patch 1, whether it is red. On
99/100 of these cutoffs, it counts as red, so almost certainly one will
judge it red. The score is updated to remove the one cutoff inconsis-
tent with this verdict. The forced-marcher then moves to patch 2. On
98/99 of the remaining cutoffs, it counts as red. So chances are it’ll be
judged accordingly. The successive choices then give odds of finding it
red 97/98, 96/97, and so on... in fact, even when one has gone almost
completely through the sorites and classified 90 of the patches as red,
the chances of classifying the (distinctly orangey) 91st patch as red will
still be high: 9/10. The odds don’t get very low till the last few patches:
the 97th patch has a 3/4 chance of counting as red, the 98th patch 2/3,
and the 99th 1/2. But of course, if the forced-march had been run the
other way, we could get into a situation where there’s a 3/4 chance that
the third patch would be judged as not-red. So the account predicts for
forced-march behaviour in an extremely strong fashion.
It’s worth emphasizing again that the chances just derived are en-
tirely consistent with the low categorical chances assigned to judging
one of the nearly-orange colour patches as red. For in each move in
the forced-march sorites, there is a tiny but real chance of defecting.
The chance of judging an almost-orange colour patch red is high con-
ditionally on getting that far down the forced-march sorites. But the chance
of getting that far in the first place is low, since the chance of defection
at some previous point is, in aggregate, high. And if one has already
defected, one is committed to a sharpening which classifies the nearly-
orange patch as not-red. So everything works out smoothly.
This account of the forced-march is strong and striking. Some
caveats: it’s not obvious that it makes the correct empirical predictions.
For example, you might think that the conditional chances towards the
end are too high. Moreover, a kind of retraction phenomenon has often
been noted — that is, once one has defected and called a given patch
not-red, then if one is asked to reclassify the last few cases, one will
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start labelling them not-red.34 It’s not obvious how to fit this into the
current model, which is built to ensure diachronic consistency. How-
ever, the model we’ve been working with is just a baseline and could be
elaborated in numerous ways — by varying the underlying measure,
by accounting for pragmatic features, and so forth.35 What I found im-
pressive on first encounter with it is the way it captured the central
feature of the forced-march — that felt pressure to keep calling patches
red — despite being designed with completely different problems in
mind.
Intermediate conclusion
The first two sections of this section developed an account of
indeterminacy-induced uncertainty. Drawing on the literature on
mushy credence, this was represented as a set of mental states an agent
is “open to”. This was linked to an account of acting under (this kind
of) uncertainty: Caprice (the claim that any act recommended by any
sharpening is permissible to perform) and Randomize (the positive
claim that one should select randomly among the acts declared per-
missible by the criteria just mentioned). Considerations of diachronic
coherence motivated, initially, a restriction of these criteria to choices
among courses of action rather than individual actions; and then an
incrementalization to localized decision situations. Applications to the
argument-form and forced-march sorites demonstrate the wider inter-
est and plausibility of the framework.
3. Elga’s Puzzle
Everything so far looks rosy for the Inconstancy view, as underpinned
by Caprice and Randomize. But Adam Elga (in commentary on an ear-
lier version of this paper) put forward a puzzle case that is well worth
34. See the discussion of backward spread in Raffman (1994) — the phenomena
she labels “hysteresis” and “reverse hysteresis” both pose challenges for my
theory.
35. Shapiro (2006) explores adding some features onto a model of vagueness
broadly similar to the one I’m exploring here.
exploring in depth. Elga’s puzzle goes like this. Suppose the broker
offered Alpha a slightly different deal: he can either invest or refuse
the contract, at fixed price, but he has an extra option: Alpha can take
a few extra dollars and be presented with the invest/refuse decision
again in five minutes (that time without the possibility of further de-




The payoffs at the lower Invest and Reject leaves are just as before.
At the Delay node, the extra dollars are given, and a second choice pre-
sented. So the upper Reject and Invest leaves have payoffs that match
those at the lower leaves, with the addition of a few dollars. Taking the
Delay option seems a no-brainer. After all, Alpha won’t close off any of
the rival options, and he’ll gain some money whichever way he goes.
But prima facie our account tells Alpha not to delay at the first
choice point he comes to (the node labelled “Start”, above). At that
moment, he faces a choice between three options:
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Start
InvestRejectDelay
Alpha is self-aware: he knows that he’s implementing the Random-
ize rule. So he knows that there’s (say) a 50/50 chance of him investing
at the later time and a 50/50 chance of him refusing at the later time.
That means he’s in a position to calculate the expected utility of the
Delay option: the expected value of his delaying is 0.5 times the value
of investing, plus 0.5 times the value of refusing.
But relative to any element of his mushy mental state, delaying
looks like a bad deal! Relative to the sharpening on which he would
judge that he is Omega, the expected value of investing (right now) far
exceeds that of refusing (right now). But it also exceeds the expected
value of delaying, since that runs a 50/50 risk of ending up doing
the bad thing. Relative to the other sharpening, on which he would
judge that he is not Omega, the expected value of refusing the contract
(right now) exceeds that of investing (right now). And again, refusing
the contract beats delaying, which runs the risk of ending up paying
money from (what relative to this stance seems) no return.
Let’s run through this more slowly. Here, again, is the original de-
cision table, with columns representing the sharpening of the crucial
indeterminacy: whether Alpha is Omega. As is now familiar, on the
first column, investing maximizes expected utility. On the second col-
umn, rejecting does so. And the Inconstancy model we have developed
says that it is permissible to take either of these options.




When we add in the Delay option, we have to decide what utility
boost the extra dollars produce. Presumably a positive one: let’s just
assume it adds a single util. The table looks schematically as follows:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest now +100 −100
Reject now +10 −90
Delay future choice+1 future choice+1
Verdict: ? ?
The utilities of the third row are determined by the expected utility
of you facing the original decision table in a minute’s time, with an
extra +1 for the dollars you are paid for your time. Since you know
you will randomize at the future time, the chance of you going with
the Invest verdict is 50/50, as is the chance of you going with the
Reject verdict. That gives us all the information we need to calculate
the expected utility:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest now +100 -100
Reject now +10 -90
Delay (0.5×100+0.5×10)+1= (0.5×−100+0.5×−90)+1=
+56 −94
Verdict: Invest now Reject now
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So while the sharpenings disagree among themselves about what
is to be done, they both condemn the “wait and see” option. By the cri-
teria we have been working with, therefore, delaying is impermissible.
To repeat: that seems like the wrong advice. Intuitively, delaying
dominates taking the decision to invest or reject immediately: whatever
you go for, you could have got a better deal by waiting. And our model
of rationality also backs that up. Recall that our initial response to
buyback problems was to evaluate sequences of action spread over
time for rational permissibility. From the atemporal perspective, a total
course of action counted as permissible iff there was some sharpening
that, for every decision situation, recommended the relevant part of the
total course of action. The sequence of actions that for Alpha secures
maximal utility on the α = ω sharpening is to first delay and then
invest. The course of actions that secures maximal utility on the other
sharpenings is to first delay and then reject. So, by our original criterion
the only permissible courses of action are the ones where we delay
(and we should randomly select which one to go with).
What Elga’s puzzle demonstrates is a prima facie inconsistency
between the original atemporal perspective which evaluated whole
courses of action (routes through a tree), and the way that we incre-
mentalized that idea in order to have something to say to ordinary
agents about the rational choices to make in local situations (nodes in
the decision trees). It looks like in order to achieve a rationally permis-
sible sequence of actions, you would have to do something rationally
impermissible at the first node. And that is not something I can live
with in a theory of decision.36
36. What we have here is an inconsistency between the theory of games — in-
cluding extended single-player games in “extensive form”, as in our decision
trees — and the theory of rational decision. Of course, both have been adapted
here to the problematic cases of decision-making under indeterminacy, so I
do not claim that such tensions arise independently. But of course, this is an
instance of a more general issue that could in principle arise without indeter-
minacy. Here’s a straightforward example: Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory
recommends cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario — orthodoxy in
game theory recommends the opposite. That is a genuine tension, and one
How should a defender of the Inconstancy model respond to this
challenge? The major issue is what one thinks the correct verdict to be.
Shall we argue that (by the lights of the Inconstancy model) delaying
is forbidden, and that this is the correct result? Or shall we argue that
the correct decision is to delay, and then find a way to get the Incon-
stancy model to align with this, the argument to the contrary above
notwithstanding? I go for the latter option. The justification for intro-
ducing an incrementalized version of Randomize was to show what
one would have to do at a local, choice-by-choice level, to ensure that
one’s course of actions collectively was a permissible one. From that
perspective, Elga’s challenge shows that the theory of individual, lo-
cal choices introduced does not succeed in its aim, and needs to be
rethought.
I will put forward four lines of response to Elga’s puzzle, which
make a case that suitably understood or tweaked, the incrementalized
decision procedure will recommend delaying in the choice situation
we have described.
3.1 Planning
When faced with the delay puzzle as originally formulated, it is tempt-
ing to think that the options for action it gives are underspecified. Af-
ter all, I could make up my mind now for what I will do in a minute’s
time. If that’s the right way to think about the choices I’m making at
the node labelled “Start”, then our earlier decision tree misrepresented
the situation; it should have been written like this:
often resolved by reformulating the decision theory in causal terms.
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Correspondingly, when evaluating the choice being made at Start,
the critical third row of the decision fragments:
α = ω α 6= ω
Invest now +100 −100




In this presentation, delaying is recommended by both sharpenings,
because they recommend different (and incompatible) determinants of
(what is now conceived of as) that determinable action.
What this response highlights is an open issue in the application
of decision theory — the individuation of the options we assess for
expected utility, and among which we select the best — -or likewise,
within the theory of games, what settles the ‘extensive form’ of a given
situation of sequential choice.37 I’m personally quite sympathetic to
37. Just to be clear here — I’m not saying that whenever game theory gives
us a criterion for selecting an optimal “strategy”, then we should think of that
as a game whose extensive form consists of a single node, with a branch for
the idea that these options might include descriptions of how we act
at some temporal distance — we needn’t think of them as something
we implement immediately.38
So I think this might be exactly the right response to the puzzle as
formulated. But we miss the force of the underlying puzzle if we rest
content with it, because it won’t generalize to the broader category
of situations of which Elga’s is a simple instance. Consider variants
of the delay puzzle in which the decision to delay has different con-
sequences. Perhaps, instead of guaranteeing that you’ll be offered the
same contract again (plus a few dollars), it just gives you a chance (if
some scenario p comes about) of receiving a much-enhanced offer —
one that gives millions to Omega, for the same small sacrifice on Al-
pha’s part. If we choose the chances and monetary reward correctly,
we can make the expected utility of this prospect equal to that of the
original delay puzzle. And indeed, we can set it up to get exactly the
each strategy. In the terminology I’m using here, I see the crtierion of strategy
selection in extensive form as telling us what sequence of choices is the best to
take. Each node then represents a separate choice. What is represented here is
a situation in which the agent literally chooses (or “plans”) how to act right at
the start.
38. Of course, overly fine-grained descriptions of actions can make nonsense of
the decision tables. Should I take a gamble that I will hit the bullseye with
a single dart, under pain of torture if I miss? If my option space includes
“taking the gamble and hitting the bullseye” and “taking the gamble and
missing the bullseye”, then decision theory will return the verdict I should
do the first, and so a fortiori take the gamble. But if I’m bad at darts and
hitting the bullseye is not in my control, this seems like bad advice. Since
one cannot right now guarantee that one’s future self will have to do one
thing rather than another, the latter two options may seem illegitimately
fine-grained.
Here’s one perspective on decision tables which distinguishes the bulls-
eye option from the delay-then-act ones. Suppose that the subject matter of
decision theory is not in the first instance a relation between beliefs, desires,
and acts, but beliefs, desires, and intention-formation. Presumably the bad dart-
player cannot form an intention to hit the bullseye, if she is self-aware enough
to know that this isn’t under her control. But prima facie, you can form inten-
tions, or plans, about your future acts — you control your future behaviour
in a relevant sense, even if you can’t guarantee you’ll follow through on your
current decision. So the more fine-grained decision table above is appropriate,
and the analogy to the dart case is inapt.
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delay puzzle structure. The natural description of the decision tree is
the following, where at the Delay node, “nature” chooses whether p or





If our options for action at Start in this tweaked version of Elga’s
puzzle situation were to invest-now, reject-now or delay (as in the situ-
ation depicted above), then we have the original puzzle all over again
— delaying would be ruled out. But again, this would be inconsistent
with the complete course of action that each sharpening recommends
from an atemporal perspective. So to generalize the solution that ap-
peals to an enriched choice at Start, we need to redescribe the options
available to the agent at Start, as involving inter alia delaying-then-
accepting-if-p, or delaying-then-rejecting-if-p. Each sharpening will
recommend one of these, over investing or rejecting immediately. But
p could be as recherché as one likes: it could be, for example, that the
United Nations in special session votes out the offer.
In ordinary situations, we are simply not choosing between plans
that make explicit provision for such whacky possibilities (and this
is the tip of the iceberg, since we can complicate the array of contin-
gencies and future decisions involved arbitrarily) — only superhuman
hyperplanners could face decision situations where they really choose
between such options. And to emphasize a point argued earlier: a the-
ory of rational decision is supposed to tell us (inter alia) about the nor-
matively correct choice between those options open to finite, limited agents
like us, relative to our information and goals. Sure, the reasoning that
determines that one among these options is the best may be beyond
our capacities; but still, it is what our idealized advisor would tell us
to do, and so remains tied to the question of what the best thing to
do is in our actual situation. By contrast, advice to take options that it
is beyond our cognitive capacities to secure is just as irrelevant to us
as advice to take options that it is beyond our physical capacities to
secure.
3.2 Incremental hyperplanning
In the glosses earlier I talked about sharpenings “recommending ac-
tions” in particular decision situations. The permissible actions in a
given situation are those “recommended by at least one sharpening”.
We need to think carefully about what this means.
Earlier, we noted that each sharpening induces a particular degree
of belief assignment for Alpha over all propositions, and equally a utility
assignment.39 Put these together, and expected utility theory delivers
recommendations for action in decision situations. That is, as well as
credences and utilities, the sharpening recommends choices in decision
situations.
But of course, we face the question: What are the relevant deci-
sion situations? We met in previous sections the idea of a hyperplan
— something that delivers a recommendation for action in arbitrary
decision situations we may meet. As we have seen, one way that
39. Recall: in the general setting, this was only so when we assumed that all
uncertainty in our mushy mental state was indeterminacy-induced. But that is
a perfectly fair assumption in the present dialectic.
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sharpening-relative credences and utilities can be applied is in eval-
uating and choosing hyperplans. And that is all fine, in its place — but
we wanted to generalize the theory so it talks about actual choice situ-
ations we face, which involve much coarser-grained option for action.
The proposal was to incrementalize choices by introducing a “score-
board”, on which “live” sharpenings are recorded. The dynamically
permissible courses of action when choosing whether to invest, reject,
or delay should be those “recommended by some live sharpening”.
Elga’s puzzle arises when we read this in one very natural way — if
we read off a given sharpening credence and utility functions, and then
apply expected-utility theory to the local decision problem (one node
in a decision tree). But an alternative interpretation is the following:
each sharpening recommends a hyperplan. And what a given sharp-
ening recommends about the decision situation at node n is simply
what the corresponding hyperplan recommends at n. But all hyper-
plans (as we saw) recommend delaying, so this is the only permissible
course of action in that choice situation.
That model is still incremental, giving advice to agents who need
to choose between relatively short-term local options rather than com-
plete hyperplans. The constraint is just that any local choice that an
agent makes be consistent with all the “live hyperplans”. It is not sub-
ject to the criticisms of the previous section, since the options which are
assessed for permissibility in a decision situation remain as localized
as one wishes.
I think just this could be a stable resting place and response to Elga;
but it would have significant costs. The trouble is that ordinary prac-
tical reasoning explanations of action don’t appeal to fit with a broad
hyperplan — they talk about what one currently believes and desires,
and how this relates to the options available to one. The decision tables
of ordinary expected-utility theory regiment this nicely. This leads to
two puzzles. First, if the response to Elga’s puzzle is simply that this
whole model of local applications of expected-utility theory is inappli-
cable, and we must instead appeal to the deliverances of rationalizable
hyperplans, then we lose a connection between what makes a decision
rational and the (local) elements of ordinary practical reasoning. Sec-
ond, we have on the table an argument that delaying was impermissi-
ble, which simply used (regimentations of) ordinary norms of practical
reasoning. And while one could respond by baldly declaring that such
reasoning is inappropriate in localized situations, that’s terribly unsat-
isfying. We can do better.
3.3 Conditionalizing on future choices
Can we get the same results as the incremental hyperplanning account,
but via the kind of local decision tables and local expected-utility cal-
culations that Elga uses? The trouble with the delay puzzle is that (we
reasonably suppose) each induced credal state will include a 0.5 cre-
dence that the post-delay decision will be to invest (/reject) given the
known 0.5 chance of making that choice in that situation. But there is
a gap from c assigning probability 1 to it being chance 0.5 that P, and c
assigning 0.5 probability in P itself. Bridging this requires we assume
a norm such as Lewis’s Principal Principle.
But the Principal Principle is not a general truth about all probabil-
ity functions. And in particular, it doesn’t hold under conditionaliza-
tion. Even if the induced credences c obey this principle, the result of
conditionalizing c on P, for example, will violate it.
So here is one way of getting the expected-utility calculations to
come out correctly: rather than calculating them relative to the mental
state induced by sharpening s directly, calculate them based on that
mental state updated by conditionalizing on the proposition that in future
decision situations the agent will act as s recommends. And so the α = ω
sharpening, for example, will assign probability 1 to one investing after
the delay, since that is what it would recommend in that situation. If
those are the rules of the game, then we can write down local decision
tables for the delay puzzle, with the (desirable) result that delaying is
recommended:
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Delay puzzle α = ω α 6= ω
Invest now +100 -100




The obvious worry is that though the rule that determines the en-
tries in the crucial cells of the third row has the form of expected-utility
calculations, the content is different — and objectionably ad hoc. What
could justify discarding one’s actual assessment of the probabilities
in favour of conditionalizing on propositions one is at best agnostic
about? The move has precedent: Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory
and various versions of causal decision theory do not weight the util-
ity of outcomes by one’s actual assessment of the probability that they
will come about, but by that probability updated (in one sense or an-
other) on the proposition that one takes the action in question.40 But
the precedent doesn’t get us very far — the motivation seems very
different, so the maneuver still seems ad hoc.
If one wished to defend this approach, I think the proper way to
think about this is the following: the real story about what rationality
recommends is given by the story about (incremental) hyperplanning
described earlier. And what we need to do is show what impact this
has on local decision tables. The principled (expected-utility) story in-
volves belief-desire pairs selecting hyperplans, sharpening by sharp-
ening. The use of conditionalized credences to make ersatz expected
utility calculations is instrumentally justified as a recipe that accords
with the principled story but is applicable to local decision situations.
In the end, therefore, I think of this proposal at it stands not as an
alternative to the incremental hyperplanning of the previous section,
but as a way of elaborating that with a kind of error theory of ordinary
40. See (Jeffrey, 1965) and (Joyce, 1999) respectively.
practical reasoning — one which comes equipped with instructions for
tweaking usual practice so that it delivers the right results. Our final
option for analyzing the situation will be far more ambitious.
3.4 Mind-making
I want to consider, finally, whether we can respond directly to the delay
puzzle in its own terms. Let’s suppose that we are faced with decision
tree as originally formulated (pace hyperplanning); that decision the-
ory is directly applicable to the choice faced at each node (pace incre-
mental hyperplanning); and that expected-utilities of options should
be calculated relative to one’s categorical credences (pace condition-
alization on future choices). Is there any way to avoid the anti-delay
conclusion?
I think there is, but it requires a far more committal interpretation of
our framework than anything we’ve needed so far. I can’t fully explore
and defend it here, but I’ll set it out and sketch its application.
The key thought will be this: It’s quite standard, in analyzing an
agent’s behaviour in decision trees, to assume that the agents know
that they will remain rational throughout the period. After all, if I
get an extra few dollars for delaying a choice, I shouldn’t take it if
there’s a high risk that I’ll go crazy in the meantime and choose the
wrong option later. So in modelling our decision situations, we should
assume that Alpha knows he’ll be rational throughout the period in
question.
On the other hand, it’s not so clear what the content of this is. One
option is to identify it as saying: Alpha always make a permissible
choice; always randomizes as recommended. That’s natural enough,
and leaves us no further on than before. But here’s a different sugges-
tion: let’s suppose that the indeterminacy in whether Alpha is Omega
translates to an indeterminacy in whether Alpha should believe that he
is Omega. In other words, what the set of sharpening-induced mental
states represent are various candidate mental states, such that it’s inde-
terminate which of them rationality recommends Alpha adopt. Accord-
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ingly, it’s indeterminate which actions rationality recommends when
Alpha gets to a decision situation. Despite it being indeterminate what
Alpha should think and do, the decision situation forces him to opt for
one or another action. So he’s stuck.
All Alpha has to cling to is this: any course of action licensed by
some sharpening is not determinately irrational. Suppose Alpha per-
forms some act A — something recommended as rationally required
by some sharpenings (s′) and condemned as rationally forbidden on
others (s′′). Then anyone who criticized Alpha as irrational would
themselves be doing something that is appropriate only on some sharp-
enings (s′′) and not on others (s′). That is, the critic would be man-
ifesting an ungrounded attachment to one of the sharpenings of the
indeterminacy other than that which Alpha chose to listen to. So acting
in the way that a sharpening recommends has at least this virtue: it
grants an immunity from neutral rational criticism.
That gives an alternative foundation for the idea of “permissible”
actions, as used throughout this paper. Rather than viewing such acts
as (determinately) rational, we regard them as only enjoying the im-
munity just identified — something that still makes them preferable to
any act that is determinately irrational. In law, certain acts may receive
no punishment, irrespective of whether they remain illegal. The option
I am exploring here is that our “permitted” acts have an analogous de-
criminalized status, which should not be confused with the question
of whether they are legal/rational.
Against that background, let us follow through the consequences of
assuming agents believe themselves to be rational in choice situations.
Consider the post-delay situation. It’s indeterminate what rationality
recommends there. But the credences induced by the α = ω sharpen-
ing will say that rationality requires investing; and hence (given that
each credence assumes that the agent will do what is rational) those
credences will assign full probability to the agent investing later on.
Correspondingly, the α 6= ω sharpening holds that rationality requires
rejection of the offer, and will assign full probability to the agent reject-
ing the post-delay offer. But that’s exactly the situation we need to get
the right recommendations in the delay puzzle!
This is an attractive place to end up. But what costs do we incur in
getting there? Well, note that the elements of your mushy mental state
will feature levels of confidence in propositions out of line with their
known chances of coming about. You know that the chance of your
investing is 0.5. And yet you are uncertain (in the sharpening-relative
sense) about whether you will invest — 1 or 0 in this proposition on
different sharpenings. In any case, your credences are not aligned to
the known chances. But such violations are not a surprise. By making
the rationality assumption, we are including assumptions about the re-
sults of future chancy processes — “inadmissible evidence” in Lewis’s
terminology. Exceptions to the Principal Principle such as this were
already provided for in Lewis’s discussion of the rule.41
Even if we can coherently make the agent confident of her own ra-
tionality in future choices, can we say the same about her past choices?
Suppose the agent faces the original broker situation and decides to
invest. Then the mental states appropriate to some sharpenings will
declare that action irrational — but since she has the information that
she did it, all the sharpenings need to give high credence to the propo-
sition that she invested, and so (on the sharpening on which this is
irrational) that she did something irrational.
Note that the dynamics of incremental choice outlined earlier en-
sure that only dead sharpenings (sharpenings no longer on the score-
board) will condemn the agent’s past choices in this way. After all, the
rule which kills them off is precisely that they fail to rationalize some-
thing the agent does. But that doesn’t speak to the concern, which was
that the agent should believe herself rational. All sharpenings (practi-
cally relevant or not) should agree on this — but it seems they don’t.
One could, I suppose, restrict the rationality assumption to the deliv-
erances of future choices. But this would both be ad hoc and also lead
to a strange epistemic state: you (determinately) believe in the future
you will always act rationally, even though your inductive evidence is
41. (Lewis, 1980).
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at best mixed.
What this forces us to do is think carefully about the significance
of the scoreboard and what we are doing when “killing off” sharpen-
ings. I’ve been careful to be neutral about it so far. But it is open to
at least two interpretations. The minimal interpretation has us having
a constant mental state of uncertainty when indeterminacy arises. For
practical purposes, we may need to act in ways that are as if we had
formed a belief about the question at hand (whether Alpha is Omega,
say) — and indeed, form a disposition to act as if this were the case
in the future, to ensure diachronic consistency between our actions.
But on this view, this is simply a point about how we act, and we do
not actually change our doxastic state or attitude to the question about
whether Alpha is Omega. The scoreboard is just bookkeeping.
On the other hand, we could think of the process as genuinely one
of making up our mind on an indeterminate matter. To be sure, the
mind-making would be groundless and arbitrary, but what results is
an updated and less uncertain belief state. On this interpretation, we
really do change our attitudes over time when forced by circumstance.
It is this mind-making interpretation of the framework that I think
is necessary to make the rationality-response to the delay puzzle co-
here. For note that if one has made up one’s mind after acting in a certain
way (investing, say), so that one’s indeterminacy-related uncertainty is
now captured only by the live sharpenings, then all the precise cre-
dences and utilities one is open to will commend one’s past actions
as rational — and so there is an inductive fit between one’s attitudes
to the past and the future. Indeed, the rationality assumption becomes
the mechanism that can drive the incremental process of mind-making
in the first place. Given the assumption that you act rationally, and
your knowledge that you have acted thus-and-so, you need to update
your mental state by eliminating sharpening-relative mental states in-
compatible with the new information.
The mind-making interpretation is far more controversial than the
previous alternatives.42 I’m attracted to it, but I wouldn’t want the in-
terest of the framework described here to rest upon it. It’s good, there-
fore, that we have an alternative response to the delay puzzle available
— the incremental hyperplanning proposal — even if it cannot embrace
expected-utility reasoning as full-bloodedly as mind-making can.
3.5 Choosing to randomize and randomly choosing
The delay puzzle has been defused. But there’s a way of tweaking
the example that makes it reveal one last striking feature of decision-
making under indeterminacy, which relates to the distinction we drew
early on between choosing randomly and choosing to randomize. I
finish by sketching this.
Consider the following variation on the delay puzzle: Faced with
the initial offer from the broker, rather than Alpha being faced with
a choice between investing-now, rejecting-now, and delaying, Alpha is
faced with the choice between investing-now, rejecting-now, and letting
the invest/reject result be settled by the flip of a fair coin (as induce-
ment, if he chooses to flip, he’ll get an extra few dollars). Call this the
flip puzzle. Notice two things: First, the situation is “consequentially
equivalent” to the delay puzzle — the chances of outcomes on corre-
sponding options in the two puzzles are the same. After all, Alpha
is perfectly aware that if he delays, he will later randomly choose, at
50/50 odds, between investing and rejecting. The coin just automates
this.
But faced with the flip decision situation, there’s no question what
our model recommends. The table looks like this:
42. Though compare the treatment of imprecise/mushy credences in Jeffrey
(1983), where a similar “mind-making” is appealed to, though one free of the
kind of rich rational constraints that I’ve been appealing to in the case of inde-
terminacy.
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α = ω α 6= ω
Invest now +100 −100
Reject now +10 −90
Flip (0.5×100+0.5×10)+1= (0.5×−100+0.5×−90)+1=
+56 −94
Verdict: Invest now Reject now
Since there are no future choices involved, no appealing to hyper-
plans or rational future actions will change the result. Unambiguously,
choosing to randomize is rejected.
To press home the differential treatment of random choices and
choices to randomize, consider a variant where we have to choose
whether to delay for a few minutes and then choose between invest-
ing and rejecting, vs. flipping a coin now to determine the result. We’ll
assume that one of the four analyses of the Delay option outlined ear-
lier is correct:





Randomly choosing is determinately preferred to flipping a coin, even
though the two give rise to the same outcomes with the same chances.
There’s a kind of bias to authentic, first-person decision-making in the
model, which seems both intriguing and puzzling.
I don’t see any argument that this is the wrong result, so I regard
this as a feature (and strong prediction) of the model, rather than a
bug. I want to make just a couple of points about the situation.
First, thinking of randomly choosing and choosing to randomize
as consequentially equivalent may be misleading. In single decision
situations, as above, they do lead to the same outcomes with the same
chances. But when embedded in decision trees, they are inequivalent.
To see this, consider the buyback offer mentioned earlier. One first
faces the decision to invest or reject the broker’s offer; but then later (if
one invests) one gets an offer from the broker to cancel the obligations
to Omega, for a partial refund of the purchase price. If one takes the
decision oneself at the first choice point whether to invest or reject, we
can be assured that one will not end up first investing and then selling
it back at a loss. Our model was designed to ensure this was so: those
sharpenings which would favour cancelling the contract (those that
have α 6= ω) are killed off after the choice to invest, as not rationalizing
the action just taken — so it will not be dynamically permissible at the
future time to accept the buyback.
On the other hand, suppose you opted to randomize at the earlier
point and ended up investing. The action you took (flipping a coin)
is itself even-handed between the recommendations of the two sharp-
enings. You don’t have grounds, based on what you did, to eliminate
one sharpening while keeping the other on the scoreboard. So this pro-
cess doesn’t get you an unambiguous recommendation to decline the
buyback offer at the later time. The point is easiest to grasp under the
final, mind-making interpretation of our machinery. Randomly choos-
ing is, inter alia, to make up one’s mind about a question in a way
that informs and constrains future choices. But choosing to random-
ize doesn’t involve making up one’s mind — it’s best understood as
an attempt to stay neutral. As we’ve seen, this difference matters to
the outcomes you secure after whole courses of actions; so it’s a good
thing that our framework marks the difference.
Intermediate conclusion
Responding to Elga’s delay puzzle requires us to get precise on exactly
how our model of decision-making under indeterminacy should apply
in extended decision situations. I see two main stable positions.
The first is incremental hyperplanning. Here, decision theory oper-
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ates primarily at the level at which hyperplans, rather than local deci-
sions, are recommended. But we, finite, agents can delay committing to
a particular permissible hyperplan as long as is convenient. The mushy
mental states of an agent can be constant throughout a decision tree,
and the scoreboard on which live sharpenings are recorded and killed
off is a notational tool and a record of changing dispositions to enact
one’s beliefs and desires, rather than a reflection of any underlying
change of view.
The second is the mind-making picture of the evolution of mushy
mental states. Here we find a far more committal picture on which, in
choosing how to act, we make a judgement call in the fullest sense —
we form a new belief. By making up our mind in this way (through
a process we know to be arbitrary and groundless — but enforced by
circumstance), over time we precisify our picture of the world. I’ve
sketched how this could be presented as a response to evidence —
under the presupposition that our actions are rational, the data that
we have acted this way or that implies that this or that (respectively)
are rational ways to act — data inconsistent with remaining open to
sharpenings that say otherwise.
Conclusion
Alpha faces a decision puzzle: Should he invest for Omega’s benefit,
when it is indeterminate whether he is Omega? The upshot of the
model of decision-making under indeterminacy developed here is to
recommend Alpha take a judgement call (in either a thin, incremental
hyperplanning sense; or a thick, mind-making, sense). The judgement
leads to an act, to invest or not to invest. Over time, coordination en-
sures that Alpha does not act inconstantly — once he has decided to
act against the recommendations of a sharpening, he is disposed to dis-
regard its advice in future. But his initial dispositions are inconstant,
in a way that would be manifest under repeat trials of his duplicates,
or in memory-wipe-and-retest scenarios.43
Our model provides rational underpinnings for inconstant action. It
also has welcome predictions for the sorites paradox. With overwhelm-
ingly likelihood, we declare cutoff statements flatly false — and we
need not say that they are even epistemically possible. And we can
account for the felt pressure to judge a patch red, conditionally on hav-
ing judged its neighbour red a moment previously. To be sure, there’s
some chance that we permissibly draw a line, or defect during a par-
ticular stage during the forced-march. But that is fine, I think: that we
sometimes draw lines or defect is as much data as is the overwhelming
rejection of such courses of action for the most part.
The model of action under indeterminacy-induced uncertainty is
profoundly different from the model of acting under risk or uncer-
tainty we are most familiar with. It refuses to hedge or aggregate de-
sirability across the possibilities one is open to. This has practical con-
sequences. If a patient is borderline between life and death, and one
has to choose between no treatment (best in the case of already-dead),
expensive-and-excellent treatment (best in case of life), and mediocre-
but-cheap treatment, then epistemic uncertainty over whether the pa-
tient is alive or dead would aggregate the risks and rewards. The
chances of helping a live patient must be weighed against the opportu-
nity costs of wasting money that could have helped others. It is easy to
draw up models where the treatment which is mediocre-but-cheaper
is recommended, as minimizing opportunity costs while still having a
chance of helping the potentially-alive patient.
But if there is genuine indeterminacy over whether the patient is
alive or dead, then on the model we have been developing, such hedg-
ing is ruled out. One sharpening — on which the patient lives yet —
will favour the expensive treatment just as much as if we were certain
the patient were alive. The other sharpening, on which the patient is
43. The limiting relative frequency of φing in such trials would (on the mind-
making picture) match the degree of determinacy of the claim that φing is
rational.
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dead already, recommends no treatment. No sharpening favours the
mediocre-but-cheap treatment. Our model has the mediocre treatment
forbidden, and forces an arbitrary choice between the expensive treat-
ment and no treatment at all. On the current model, action under inde-
terminacy does not tolerate compromise.
A. Appendix: Indeterminacy-induced mushy beliefs
One model of indeterminacy-induced mushy mental states involves
projecting credences in precise propositions in a sharpening-relative
manner into degrees of belief across all propositions. The resulting
set of possible degrees of belief are the mushy set that characterizes
the agent’s mental state. To model this, suppose that c is a credence
assignment over worlds w ∈ W, and let |p|sw give the truth value (1
for truth, 0 for falsity) of (sentence or proposition) p at world w and
sharpening s. Then the mushy set that c induces is:
{P : ∃s∀q[P(q) = ∑
w
c(w)|q|sw]}
The recipe just given works only if we spot ourselves the under-
lying c. Here is a more general formulation (to use this I will use w
ambiguously, to indicate both the world w, and the proposition which,
determinately, is true at w and false everywhere else). First, let the set
Ps be the set of “probabilities relative to s”. In our finite setting Ps will
be the functions P from propositions to [0, 1] such that 1 = ∑w∈W P(w)
and for arbitrary proposition q, P(q) = ∑w∈W P(w)|q|sw. Now let C be
an arbitrary constraint on one’s degrees of belief — for example, it
could be that one’s credences in the world-propositions w take certain
specific values; it could be that one’s credences in some other (possibly
vague) propositions take certain specific values; or it could be specified
some other way. We model it by a subset of the set of functions from
propositions to [0, 1]. Then the indeterminacy-induced belief state BC
generated by constraints C will be given as the union (over sharpenings
s) of the sets BCs = Ps ∩ C. Our assumption will be that permissible
belief states in the presence of indeterminacy must be generated in this
way by some C.
When Ps ∩ C is a singleton set for each s, I will say that the belief
state involved has only indeterminacy-induced uncertainty. The distinc-
tion between cases where the uncertainty is entirely indeterminacy-
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induced, and cases where some uncertainty remains even after sharp-
ening, plays a key role in allowing us to characterize conditions under
which selecting a sharpening is tantamount to selecting a recommen-
dation for action.
Notice that in the special case where C is a complete (and proba-
bilistically coherent) assignment of credences to worlds, then Ps ∩ C
is a singleton set, and the union of these over s gives us exactly the
mushy belief state described earlier. But we could instead have a con-
straint which requires, inter alia, that P(R) = 1 and P(w ∨ u) = 1, in
the presence of two sharpenings, one of which (s′) makes R true at
w and false at u, and the other of which (s′′) requires the reverse. In
that case, Ps′ will contain only functions P such that P(w) = 1, and
Ps′′ will contain only functions P such that P(w) = 0. So the gener-
ated belief state BC will have no settled level of confidence invested
in w (nor, indeed, in u). In other words, this agent has full confidence
in the known indeterminate proposition R, and in virtue of that is ra-
tionally required to be uncertain, in the indeterminacy-induced sense.
But the topic over which she is uncertain is not a vague proposition,
but the underlying state of the world. A case in point was described
earlier (where the proposition R is “I act rationally” and the worlds in
question describe the precise facts about the agent’s future acts).
B. Appendix: Indeterminacy-induced mushy desires
Alpha’s intrinsic desires are for something that can be indeterminate
in particular physical situations: that he himself gets goodies. We now
model the consequences of such an indeterminate desire as part of
a mushy mental state — first concentrating on desirability of worlds
alone, and then, in combination with degrees of belief, desirabilities
across all propositions.
Suppose that v ∈ V is a vector with one entry for each determinant
of utility, and f a function from such vectors to real numbers, such that
f (v) gives the utility of possessing exactly the features described by v.
In general, it can be vague whether a world w has the features specified
by a given v. One of the determinants of utility for Alpha could be, for
example, the amount of money possessed by Alpha in a week’s time,
where (as above) it is vague whether Alpha is even around in a week’s
time.
Relative to a sharpening, however, we can let vsw be exactly the vec-
tor that specifies the determinants of utility possessed by w on sharp-
ening s, and this enables the utility determination function to induce
a valuation of worlds: fs(w) := f (vsw). The mushy desire state, eval-
uating worlds, induced by a (potentially vague) utility-determination
function f is therefore {u : ∃s[u = fs]}.
Relative to an assignment of degrees of belief to propositions, we
can then apply the rules of standard expected-utility theory to deter-
mine a set of assignments of desirability to propositions, induced by
those degrees of belief and a world-desirability drawn from the above
mushy set.
For indeterminacy-induced mental states: suppose we are given, as
determinants of an indeterminacy-infected mental state, a constraint
C on degrees of belief and a utility-determination function f . The
associated mushy mental state MC, f will be the set of those pairs
〈p, u〉 such that for some s, (i) p ∈ BCs ; and (ii) u satisfies the axioms
for expected-utility theory relative to probability p and valuation of
worlds u(w) = f (vsw).
C. Appendix: Sharpenings recommending action
Suppose an agent is in a decision situation, with the options for action
drawn from set O. The agent has a mushy mental state, each element of
which assigns utility to the acts within O. Each element of the mental
state recommends a particular act,44 but these recommendations may
conflict.
Caprice is then the principle that the agent may permissibly act in
any of the ways recommended by any sharpening, given her mental
state; and Randomize is the principle that she must choose the sharp-
ening to listen to at random (more precisely: if φ is recommended for
44. Though note the qualification in the final paragraph of this appendix.
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action by exactly measure k of the sharpening, one’s chances of φing
should be k).
In characterizing Caprice and Randomize for indeterminacy-
induced mushy mental states, I switched from talking of what options
for actions are recommended by particular elements of one’s mushy
mental state (belief-desire pairs, which assign utilities to all acts) and
what sharpenings recommend. It is crucial to our model that the latter
is legitimate, since in a general setting it is sharpenings over which a
measure is defined which characterize the odds at which Randomize
is to operate. If a sharpening could be associated with two incompat-
ible recommendations for action, then we wouldn’t know whether to
allocate the weight assigned to the sharpening to one act or the other.
When the mushy mental state is generated by an underlying cre-
dence across worlds and (a potentially vague) utility-determination
function, then each sharpening generates a unique member of the
mushy mental state. More generally, where the uncertainty in a given
mental state is (in the terminology introduced in appendix A) entirely
indeterminacy-induced, then each sharpening will generate a unique
member of the mushy mental state. So under these assumptions, se-
lecting a sharpening will indirectly select a specific recommendation
for action.
Where some uncertainty is not indeterminacy-induced, then we
need some other story to tell. But this shouldn’t be a surprise: expected-
utility theory, supplemented with a theory of decision-making under
indeterminacy-generated uncertainty, shouldn’t by itself predict how
to behave under other kinds of uncertainty. So our story does exactly
what it needs to.45
A final coda: Even granted all this, a sharpening might not rec-
45. If one wants a sketch about how it could be integrated into a wider the-
ory of decision-making under any kind of uncertainty, here’s an option: take
your favoured account of acting under uncertainty when indeterminacy isn’t
involved — perhaps Levi’s loss-minimization rule. If uncertainty remains even
after sharpening, apply this story to retrieve the recommendation for action,
and then treat that as the recommendation delivered by randomly selecting
that sharpening.
ommend a particular option for action, since according to it, two in-
compatible acts are assigned the same expected utility. I suggest the
following patch: calculate the weights of sharpenings assigned to sets
of optimal acts — so that if φ and ψ are tied on s, then the weight of s
counts towards the set {φ, ψ} rather than {φ} or {ψ} alone. If Random-
ize selects a non-singleton set as the operative recommendation, then
the agent’s options are whatever they would be in the ordinary case —
perhaps either act is permissible (I do not want to assume that here the
agent needs to randomize — perhaps she can exercise discretion here
on a more voluntaristic basis).46
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